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AGENCY INDISCRETION: JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF THE IMMIGRATION COURTS
CHRISTOPHER MANIONt
INTRODUCTION
For many immigrants, becoming a permanent resident of the
United States is a difficult process. Although the United States
allowed virtually unrestricted immigration during its first one
hundred years, federal legislation passed since then has limited
immigrants' ability to become United States citizens.1 Despite
the restrictions placed on immigration by federal law, the United
States remains a beacon of hope to many immigrants who flee
from persecution endured in their home countries. 2
People who fear persecution in their homelands and seek
protection in another country such as the United States can
generally be grouped into two categories: refugees and asylum
t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 2002,
Penn State University. I would like to thank Jenine Barunas, who helped me
through the difficult times, and my parents, David and Treacy Manion, who never
stopped believing in me.
I See Stephen Yale-Loehr & Lindsay Schoonmaker, Overview of U.S.
Immigration Law (2006), http://www.millermayer.com/index2.php?this-cat=l&
this sub cat=l&articleid=14&keyword=schoonmaker#14; see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting the federal government
power to prevent aliens from entering the United States and the President power to
capture and remove aliens from the United States). See generally MARGARET C.
JASPER, THE LAW OF IMMIGRATION (1996) (discussing the history of immigration law
within the United States); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION
(1996) (presenting issues of constitutional rights afforded to immigrants throughout
American history). For a list of federal immigration legislation from 1790 through
1996, see U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HISTORICAL IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION LEGISLATION, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (follow
"Education & Resources" hyperlink; then follow "Immigration Legal History"
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
2 See generally TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, ASYLUM
LAW, ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES: A PRIMER (2006), http://trac.syr.edu/
immigration/reports/161/ [hereinafter TRAC REPORT] (describing the origins and
continued significance of asylum and refugee law).
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seekers. 3 The main distinction between these two groups is their
location. Refugees appeal for protection in the United States
while located in another country, whereas asylum applicants
have already entered the United States when they request
protection. 4 This Note focuses solely on the challenges faced by
asylum applicants.
Asylum applicants in the United States must show a well
founded fear of persecution in their home country on the basis of
their "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion. '5 This burden is difficult for
asylum applicants to meet, as they frequently arrive in the
United States with little proof of the dangers from which they
escaped. 6 As a result, asylum applicants must often rely solely
on their own oral testimony to convince the immigration
authorities that they meet the requirements for asylum. 7
Zhen Li Iao was an asylum applicant forced to rely on her
oral testimony.8 Iao, a Chinese immigrant, was denied asylum
by an immigration judge who based his decision in large part on
the fact that lao did not provide documentary evidence of her
membership in a religion that had been outlawed in China and
whose members were subjected to government persecution. 9 lao
appealed this denial to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
which ultimately vacated the immigration judge's ruling and
remanded the case.10  Judge Posner's opinion criticized the
immigration judge in particular and the immigration courts in
general for their over-emphasis on asylum applicants' lack of
documentary evidence supporting their claims.1" Posner
sardonically noted that an "illegal religious movement is unlikely
to issue membership cards."1 2
The legal framework of the asylum application process is
complex. Federal legislation has placed the power to regulate
3 See TRAC REPORT, supra note 2; Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1.
4 See TRAC REPORT, supra note 2.
5 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2007); see
TRAC REPORT, supra note 2.
6 See TRAC REPORT, supra note 2.
7 See id.
8 See lao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 530, 531 (7th Cir. 2005).
9 See id. at 532.
10 See id. at 533.
11 See id. at 534.
12 Id.
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immigration in the hands of the executive branch, which in turn
has created several agencies to control immigration in the United
States. 13 The Department of Justice oversees the immigration
courts, the court system that must be navigated by many asylum
applicants seeking to remain residents of the United States. 14
Recently, the immigration judges who preside over these courts
have come under fire for decisions that fail to meet the standards
expected from them by the Department of Justice. 15 Immigrants
can appeal an immigration judge's ruling to the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 1 6 However, this division of the
Department of Justice is at the center of a recent circuit split
over whether a particular type of ruling, in which the BIA
affirms an immigration judge's ruling without issuing an opinion,
is subject to judicial review by the circuit courts.
This Note examines the challenges faced by asylum
applicants and the federal courts' disagreement about the extent
to which the judicial branch can intervene in the executive
branch's review of asylum applications. Part I of this Note
provides an overview of the immigration court system and
examines the recently alleged faults and abuses within the
immigration courts. Part II examines the issue of whether the
U.S. circuit' courts have jurisdiction to review the decision by the
appellate division of the immigration courts to affirm without
opinion the ruling of an immigration judge. Finally, Part III
reviews recently proposed changes to the immigration courts
made by former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and proposes
a resolution to the circuit split addressed in Part II.
13 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III
2003); Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 261, 262 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The
Immigration and Nationality Act was amended by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 ... [which] transferred the functions of the INS to various bureaus... within
the Department of Homeland Security. The functions of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review [which oversees the immigration courts] continue to reside in
the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."). See
generally Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1 (explaining the role of executive
agencies).
14 See Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1; infra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
15 The immigration courts have recently been criticized by several different
sources. Among the critics are the U.S. Courts of Appeals, a Syracuse University
research organization, and the U.S. Department of Justice. See infra notes 46-86
and accompanying text.
16 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2006); Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1.
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I. THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM
A. The Authority and Organization of the Courts
The Constitution does not expressly address immigration,
but within the enumerated powers it does confer on Congress
some authority with respect to foreign citizens. 17 These powers
can be found in the Commerce Clause,18 the Naturalization
Clause,' 9  the War Power Act,20  and the Migration and
Importation Clause.2' In addition to these enumerated powers,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as granting
Congress complete power to make immigration law. 22 Thus,
Congress has complete authority over immigration issues. This
authority has in turn been delegated by Congress to the
executive branch of the federal government through a complex
series of statutes. 23
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act 24 and its
subsequent amendments, control of immigration has been
divided primarily between the Department of Homeland Security
and the Department of Justice, with a majority of the power
vesting in the Department of Homeland Security. 25 Within the
17 See JASPER, supra note 1, at 1.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause grants Congress the power "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign Nations." Id. The Supreme Court has defined the
commerce power to include regulation of the carriage of passengers on boats. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 2-3 (1824).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This clause grants Congress the power "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." Id.
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. This clause grants Congress the power to
declare war, the federal government power to prevent aliens from entering the
United States, and the President power to capture and remove aliens from the
United States. JASPER, supra note 1, at 1.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This clause actually prevented Congress from
restricting the states from admitting persons, but the restriction was limited in
duration, ending in 1808. Id.
22 See Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 270-71, 274 (1875); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283,
304-05 (1849). See NEUMAN, supra note 1, at 44-51, for a discussion of this line of
Supreme Court cases.
23 For a list of federal legislation from 1790 through 1996, see U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 1.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000).
25 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423
F.3d 260, 262 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 'The Immigration and Nationality Act was
amended by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 .. . [which] transferred the functions
of the INS to various bureaus.., within the Department of Homeland Security. The
[Vol. 82:787
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Department of Justice, however, is the Executive Office for
Immigration Review ("EOIR"), an administrative unit consisting
of the immigration judges ("IJs") and the BIA. 26 The Js conduct
removal hearings, at which foreign nationals 27 present in the
United States face the possibility of deportation or exclusion from
the country. 28 The BIA hears appeals from the Js' decisions in
these matters.29 The BIA is made up of attorneys who "act as the
Attorney General's delegates in the cases that come before
them."30 The EOIR is "responsible for the.., supervision of the
[BIA and] the Office of the Chief [IJ] ... in the execution of their
respective duties."31
B. The EOIR's Response to Overcrowded Immigration Courts
In 1984, the BIA received less than 3,000 new appeals.32 By
1998, however, the BIA "received 'in excess of 28,000 appeals.' "3
As a result of the backlog, some cases have taken more than five
years to be resolved. 34 It has been suggested that many of the
appeals were filed in order to take advantage of the delay that
the backlog of cases created.35  In order to eliminate
overcrowding in the BIA's caseload, the EOIR enacted
streamlining procedures. 36 These measures, passed in 1999 and
amended in 2002, sped up the time it took for the BIA to rule on
appeals.
functions of the Executive Office of Immigration Review continue to reside in the
Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." Id.; see Yale-
Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1.
26 See Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1.
27 A foreign national is "a foreign-born person who is not a citizen or national of
the United States." Id.
28 See id. The proceeding varies depending on the status of the foreign national
involved. If the foreign national seeks admission to the United States, he has the
burden of showing that he is admissible. In contrast, if the foreign national proves
that he has already been lawfully admitted, the burden is on the government to
show that the foreign national is deportable. Id.
29 Id.
30 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2007). Thus, the BIA is "directly accountable to the
Attorney General." Yale-Loehr & Schoonmaker, supra note 1.
31 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1) (2007).
32 Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2006).
33 Id. (quoting Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg.
56,135, 53,136 (Oct. 18, 1999)).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See id.
20081
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The streamlining provision, contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1,
provides that when an IJ's removal order is appealed to the BIA,
the case is first reviewed by a single member of the BIA. Prior to
the enactment of the streamlining rules, such appeals were heard
by a panel of three BIA members. 37 The single BIA member has
three options when hearing an appeal: He may affirm without
opinion the decision of the IJ;38 he may "issue a brief order
affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review;"39
or he may order that the case be heard by a three member panel
of the BIA.40 The regulations provide that the "[BIA] members
shall exercise their independent judgment and discretion in
considering and determining the cases coming before the
Board... ."41
The Code of Federal Regulations provides explicit
instructions on the procedures a BIA member is to follow in
affirming without opinion the ruling of an IJ. The relevant
section states:
The Board member to whom a case is assigned shall affirm the
decision of the Service or the [IJ], without opinion, if the Board
member determines that the result reached in the decision
under review was correct; that any errors in the decision under
review were harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) The issues
on appeal are squarely controlled by existing Board or federal
court precedent and do not involve the application of precedent
to a novel factual situation; or (B) The factual and legal issues
raised on appeal are not so substantial that the case warrants
the issuance of a written opinion in the case. 42
In contrast, the BIA member "may" only assign the case to a
three member panel if the case presents one of the following
circumstances:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of
different [IJs]; (ii) The need to establish a precedent construing
the meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures; (iii) The need to
review a decision by an [IJ] or the Service that is not in
37 See Jessica R. Hertz, Comment, Appellate Jurisdiction over the Board of
Immigration Appeals's Affirmance Without Opinion Procedure, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
1019, 1021, 1023 & nn.24-25 (2006).
38 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2007).
39 Id. § 1003.1(e)(5).
40 Id. § 1003.1(e)(6).
41 Id. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii).
42 Id. § 1003.1(e)(4).
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conformity with the law or with applicable precedents; (iv) The
need to resolve a case or controversy of major national import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination
by an [IM]; or (vi) The need to reverse the decision of an IJ or the
Service, other than a reversal under § 1003.1(e)(5). 43
These procedures helped the BIA reduce its backlog of cases,
which numbered 57,879 on September 30, 2001, to about half by
2006.44
The streamlining procedure has been at the center of a
recent split in the circuit courts. Several circuits have held that
they have jurisdiction to review the decision of a single BIA
member to streamline the decision of an IJ, while other circuits
have held that such decisions are committed to agency discretion
and thus not subject to judicial review. 45
C. Recently Alleged Faults in the Immigration Courts
Recently, the immigration courts have come under fire from
various sources. Several circuit court decisions reviewing the
cases of aliens denied asylum by the immigration courts have
been highly critical of the manner in which the IJs handled the
cases. Additionally, a recent study released by the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse ("TRAC"), a research organization
affiliated with Syracuse University, indicates a wide discrepancy
in the rates at which Is have granted asylum in the past ten
years and suggests that the immigration courts have failed to
apply uniformly its internal procedures. 46  Finally, the
Department of Justice recently engaged in an investigation of the
immigration courts in response to the aforementioned allegations
of misconduct. This investigation concluded with former
Attorney General Gonzales announcing the enactment of
widespread alterations to the immigration court system.
1. Circuit Court Critiques
In Iao v. Gonzales,47 Judge Posner criticized the analysis of
an IJ in denying the asylum request of Zhen Li Iao, a Chinese
43 Id. § 1003.1(e)(6).
44 See Kamboli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 458 (2d Cir. 2006).
45 See discussion infra Part II.
46 See TRAC REPORT, supra note 2.
47 400 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005).
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citizen. 48 Judge Posner concluded that the IJ's decision was
"unreasoned" and thus vacated the decision and remanded the
case to the immigration court. 49 The IJ's opinion listed five
reasons for denying lao's asylum application. Posner took issue
with each of them. 50 First, the IJ stated that Iao had not been
persecuted in China. 51  Actual persecution, however, is not
necessary for the granting of asylum, and thus Posner called this
reason a "nonissue."52  Another reason given by the IJ for
denying lao's application was based on an error in the IU's
reading of the record.53 The remaining three rationales of the IJ
were based on the IU's lack of familiarity with lao's foreign
culture and communication barriers caused by Iao's inability to
speak English and the use of an interpreter who did not have a
"good command of English."54
Judge Posner concluded his opinion by noting "six disturbing
features" in the way lao's case was handled that seemed to be a
recurrent problem with IJ decisions. 55 First, he pointed to the
lack of familiarity with relevant foreign cultures exhibited by
IJs.56 Second, he pointed to the IU's "exaggerated notion of how
much religious people know about their religion."57  Third, he
criticized the Id's emphasis on lao's lack of documentary evidence
48 See id. at 533. While living in China, lao practiced Falun Gong, a religion
that had been outlawed by the Chinese government in 1999. When Chinese
government officials became aware of lao's affiliation with Falun Gong, police tried
to confront her and make her abandon the religion. Iao, however, was able to evade
the police and fled to the United States. At her removal hearing, the IJ concluded
that she did not have a "well-founded fear of being persecuted by the Chinese
government," and therefore, the IJ denied her asylum application. The BIA
streamlined her case, affirming without opinion the IJ's ruling. See id. at 531-32.
49 See id. at 533. Judge Posner did not comment as to whether Iao should have
been granted asylum. Posner merely concluded that lao was entitled to a "rational
analysis of the evidence" by the immigration courts, an analysis that Iao was denied.
Id. Posner stated that because the BIA affirmed without opinion, a rational analysis
of lao's claims could not be identified from the BIA. Id.
50 See id. at 532-33.
51 See id. at 532.
52 See id.
53 See id. The IJ indicated that although lao's brother was a follower of Falun
Gong, he failed to submit an affidavit stating that Iao was as well. It turned out,
however, that Iao's brother was not a follower of Falun Gong and that the IJ had
simply "misread the record." Id.
54 See id. at 532-33.
55 Id. at 533-35.
56 See id. at 533. 'The [IJ] offered no justification for regarding a person's lack of
knowledge of Falun Gong doctrines as evidence of a false profession of faith." Id.
57 Id. at 534.
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of her membership in Falun Gong.58 Fourth, Posner criticized
the IU's "insensitivity" to the communication difficulties posed by
the use of an interpreter in the proceedings. 59 Fifth, he faulted
the IU's failure "to make clean determinations of credibility,"
stating that the IJ's statement that Iao did not meet her burden
left the reviewing court with no idea if this failure was based on
the credibility of the asylum applicant or on other reasons. 60
Finally, Posner criticized the BIA's affirmance without opinion in
cases like Iao, where the opinion of the IJ contained "manifest
errors of fact and logic." 61
In pointing out the above disturbing features, Posner stated
that he did not offer them in "a spirit of criticism," and that the
cases before his court were "not a random sample of all asylum
cases."62  But this Note contends that these critiques are
indicative of widespread flaws in the EOIR's management of the
immigration court system. Moreover, Judge Posner and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not alone in their critiques
of the immigration courts.
In Wang v. Attorney General,63 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals criticized an IU's conduct during the asylum hearing of
another Chinese citizen.64 The plaintiff in this case, Qun Wang,
58 See id.
The [U's] zeal for documentation reached almost comical proportions when
after Li had testified ... in considerable detail about locations ... in which
she had participated in demonstrations against the persecution of Falun
Gong, he upbraided her for having "failed to submit to the court any letters
or photographs or any other evidence whatsoever to corroborate these
claims." Since the demonstrators are mainly Chinese who might one day
want or be forced to return to China, they are hardly likely to be taking
photos of each other demonstrating, or to be creating other documentary
proof of participating in demonstrations of which the Chinese government
deeply disapproves.
Id.
59 See id.
60 See id. at 534-35.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 535. Posner went on to state:
Even if they are representative, given caseload pressures and.., resource
constraints [of the EOIR], it is possible that nothing better can realistically
be expected than what we are seeing in this and like cases. But we are not
authorized to affirm unreasoned decisions even when we understand why
they are unreasoned.
Id.
63 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
64 See id. at 267-70.
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appealed the ruling of an IJ, affirmed by the BIA, which denied
his application for asylum. 65 The Third Circuit concluded that
the IU's determination that Wang was not credible was not
supported by substantial evidence and remanded the case to the
immigration courts. 66 The Third Circuit noted "[a] disturbing
pattern of IJ misconduct [that] has emerged notwithstanding the
fact that some of [its] sister courts have repeatedly echoed [the
Third Circuit's] concerns." 67
The Third Circuit issued a scathing rebuke of the IU's
conduct throughout the asylum hearing and noted numerous
other instances of similar conduct by other IJs. 68 The court found
that the IU's apparent bias against Wang was sufficient to
overturn her decision. 69  The record from Wang's case was
littered with belittling and humiliating remarks directed at
Wang by the IJ. In her oral opinion, the IJ stated that she was
"embarrass[ed]" to have Wang in her courtroom and that she was
"comfortable denying asylum to the respondent as a matter of
discretion because [he was] a horrible father;" moreover, "she was
not bothered by the respondent's plight."70  According to the
Third Circuit, "[t]he tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the
sarcasm of the IJ seem[ed] more appropriate to a court television
show than a federal court proceeding."71 The court further found
that the substantive issues on which the IJ based her decision
were irrelevant to Wang's asylum claim.72 The court also noted
65 See id. at 261. Wang applied for asylum claiming that he had been subject to
past persecution in China. After his wife gave birth to their first child, Wang alleged
that government officials forcibly inserted an intrauterine device into his wife. Wang
and his wife requested permission to have another child, but the request was denied.
Wang's wife had the intrauterine device removed by a private doctor and she
subsequently became pregnant. Soon after giving birth to the child, Wang claimed
that government officials subjected his wife to involuntary sterilization under
government regulations. Wang's asylum application was denied by the IJ, and that
ruling was affirmed by a BIA member who issued a one paragraph opinion adopting
the position of the IJ. See id. at 261-67.
66 See id. at 271.
67 See id. at 268.
68 See id. at 267-71.
69 Id. at 269 ("[E]ven if the IJ was not actually biased-and we do not speculate
here as to her state of mind-the 'mere appearance of bias' on her part 'could still
diminish the stature' of the judicial process she represents." (quoting Clemmons v.
Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 327 (3d Cir. 2004))).
70 Id. at 265.
71 Id. at 269.
72 See id. According to the Third Circuit, the issues that should have been
addressed by the IJ were "whether Wang's wife had been forcibly sterilized" and
[Vol. 82:787
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several other cases in which Js had displayed similarly
deplorable conduct.7 3 Taken together, Iao and Wang illustrate a
recurring problem of IJs abusing their authority.
2. Disparity in the Rate at Which IJs Grant Asylum
In 2006, TRAC released a report that called into question the
EOIR's "commitment to providing a 'uniform application of the
nation's immigration laws in all cases.' ",74 The report analyzed
rulings of individual IJs in asylum cases and found a wide
disparity in the rate at which IJs granted asylum. 75 The report
was based on data collected from the EOIR from the years 1994
through 2005, including all recorded asylum cases from that
period. 76
The report indicated that the median denial rate for IJs was
65%-i.e., one-half of the IJs denied asylum claims in more than
whether he would be subject to "improper punishment" by the Chinese government
if he were removed from the United States; instead, the IJ's opinion focused on
"whether Wang was a good father and son." Id. at 269-70.
73 See id. at 267 ("Time and time again, we have cautioned [IJs] against making
intemperate or humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings."); see also
Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) ("The conduct of the IJ
itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding."); Lopez-Umanzor v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that IJ's determination of
aliens' credibility was "skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias, and
conjecture"); Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating that the IJ
apparently searched for ways to "undermine and belittle" the alien's testimony);
Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2005) (faulting IJ's use of his own
knowledge of Catholicism to aggressively question an alien); Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft,
396 F.3d 272, 287 n.20 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing the "extreme hostility the IJ
exhibited toward [the petitioner] throughout the hearing, commencing at its very
inception, as well as the inevitable effect upon an individual seeking asylum of an
interrogation conducted in so intimidating a manner by a government official
supposed to be a neutral arbiter"); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 250 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that the IJ's opinion "consist[ed] not of the normal drawing of intuitive
inferences from a set of facts, but, rather, of a progression of flawed sound bites that
[gave] the impression that she was looking for ways to find fault with Dia's
testimony"); Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the IJ abandoned her role as neutral fact finder and faulting the IJ's "sarcastic
commentary and moral attacks"); Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.
1986) (cautioning IJ not to determine credibility based upon "personal choices that
an asylum applicant has made concerning marriage, children, and living
arrangements").
74 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION JUDGES
(2006), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/ [hereinafter IMMIGRATION
JUDGES].
75 See id.
76 See id. During that time period, the EOIR handled 297,240 cases. Id.
2008]
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65% of their cases while one-half of the IWs denied asylum claims
in less than 65% of their cases. It also found that out of the 208
IJs that had decided more than 100 cases, there were eight IJs
that denied asylum to nine out of ten applicants, and there were
two IJs that granted asylum to nine out of ten applicants. 77 The
data also indicated that 10% of IJs denied asylum in 86% or more
of their decisions and 10% of the IJs denied asylum in 34% or less
of their decisions. 78 To ensure accurate analysis of data by
comparing similarly situated asylum seekers, the report went on
to compare only asylum seekers from China who were
represented by attorneys and who came before IJs in New York
City.79 The results of this analysis were consistent with the
results of the broader survey: There was a similar disparity in
the rate at which the specific IJs denied asylum requests. Then,
reviewing the results of the same IJs for cases involving non-
Chinese asylum seekers, the results were again similarly
disparate.80  The report stated that "[g]iven the broad
constitutional hope that similarly situated individuals will be
treated in similar ways and the EOIR's stated goal of providing
uniform application of the immigration laws, the disparities in
this aspect of the court's operations are surprising."81  The
findings of this report suggest that the problems in the
immigration courts that were pointed out by the federal court
judges in Part II.A are a significant problem. Additionally, as the
next section will illustrate, former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales, the former head of the EOIR, has virtually conceded
that there are widespread problems in the immigration court
system.
3. Department of Justice Investigation and Overhaul
In January of 2006, former Attorney General Gonzales
initiated an investigation of the immigration courts in response
to the criticisms leveled at his agency by the federal courts.8 2 In
his statement regarding the investigation, Gonzales remarked
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
8o Id.
81 Id.
82 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration
Appeals (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag-520.html.
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that the conduct of some IJs "can aptly be described as
intemperate or even abusive" and that their work "must
improve. '8 3 After reviewing the results of the investigation,
Gonzales directed the implementation of twenty-two measures
aimed at improving the operation of the EOIR.8 4 Among the
reforms called for by Gonzales were improving the BIA's
streamlining procedure, periodically evaluating the performance
of IJs and BIA members, and requiring that all IJs appointed
after December 31, 2006 pass a written examination on
immigration law prior to adjudicating matters.8 5
While it is clear that former Attorney General Gonzales took
the allegations against the immigration courts seriously, it is not
clear that the implementation of these changes will remedy the
situation. Moreover, the circuit courts are currently in dispute
over a key issue of the EOIR controversy, the extent to which
judicial review can assist in maintaining the fairness of BIA
decisions.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE BIA'S STREAMLINING PROCEDURE
The circuit courts disagree over whether they have
jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion
a case on appeal from an IJ ruling. Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 6 a court reviewing a final order of
removal can review "all questions of law and fact. . . arising from
any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien."8 7
And under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),s s "[a]
person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."8 9 Thus, the general rule is that actions of the BIA and
the IJs are subject to judicial review when a foreign national
challenges his final order of removal.
83 IMMIGRATION JUDGES, supra note 74.
84 Press Release, supra note 82.
85 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE IMMIGRATION COURTS
AND THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 1-5 (2006), http:/Ibibdaily.comlpdfs/
22measuressummary.pdf.
86 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000).
87 Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 2006).
88 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
89 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
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The APA, however, expressly precludes judicial review of
agency action in two situations. First, judicial review is not
available if any statute precludes judicial review.90 Second,
judicial review is not available if the agency's "action is
committed to agency discretion by law."91 All of the circuit courts
considering the issue have concluded that no statute precludes
them from reviewing the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion
under the streamlining regulations. Thus, the first exception
under the APA does not prevent review of the streamlining
decision. However, the circuit courts addressing the issue are
split on whether the streamlining decision is "committed to
agency discretion by law."
A. Jurisdiction to Review
The First, Third, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that
they have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to affirm
without opinion the decision of an IJ. 92 The courts' analysis of
the issue focused on the APA and Heckler v. Chaney,93 a case in
90 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (2000).
91 Id. § 701(a)(2).
92 At least one court has questioned the necessity of reviewing the BIA's
streamlining decision because review of an IJ's ruling, as the final agency action, is
expressly provided for in the INA. See Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 986 (8th Cir.
2004). Thus, Ngure argued that deciding whether the BIA was appropriate in ruling
that the IJ was correct made little sense when the court could simply determine for
itself whether the IJ was correct. See id. ("[A]n appeal to determine whether the BIA
was correct to find that the IJ's decision was correct serves 'no purpose whatever'
when the court can directly review the IJ's decision."). But, there are circumstances
in which review of the BIA's decision to streamline is more significant than Ngure
contends. Under the INA, not every removal order is reviewable. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (2000). In Haoud v. Ashcroft, review of the BIA's ruling was
necessary to determine on what grounds the BIA affirmed the IJ's removal order
because that determination would inform the court as to whether it had jurisdiction
to review the IJ's decision. 350 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003); see also infra notes 96-
99 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in Chen v. Ashcroft the Ninth Circuit
stated that where the BIA streamlined a case "despite the presence of novel legal
questions, a complex factual scenario, and applicability to numerous other aliens,"
review of the IJ's ruling and the BIA's ruling do not "'collapse into one analysis'" as
the Eighth Circuit suggested it does in Ngure. Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1081, 1088
(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 853 n.7 (9th Cir.
2003)); see also infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
93 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Heckler involved a death row inmate's challenge of the
Food and Drug Administration's decision not to undertake an enforcement action
with respect to drugs used in lethal injections that allegedly violated the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. In reversing the Court of Appeals, which held it could review the
agency's decision not to act, the Supreme Court indicated that there was a
AGENCY INDISCRETION
which the Supreme Court examined the APA's two exceptions to
the general rule allowing review of agency action. The
dispositive question for these courts was whether the decision to
streamline a case was "committed to agency discretion by law."
Under Heckler, an agency's action is committed to agency
discretion if the law under which the agency exercises its
authority is "drawn so that a court would have no meaningful
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion."94
In Haoud v. Ashcroft,95 the First Circuit concluded it had
jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion
because the decision was not committed to agency discretion.96
The Attorney General argued that under Heckler, the BIA's
decision to streamline was committed to the discretion of the
EOIR, and thus, not reviewable. Distinguishing the case from
Heckler, the First Circuit reasoned that the streamlining rules
provided a sufficient standard for reviewing the BIA decision 97:
Here, the Board's own regulation provides more than enough
"law" by which a court could review the Board's decision to
streamline .... [T]he Board cannot affirm an IJ's decision
without opinion if the decision is incorrect, errors in the decision
are not harmless or immaterial, the issues on appeal are not
squarely controlled by Board or federal court precedent and
involve the application of precedent to a novel fact situation, or
the issues raised on appeal are so substantial that a full written
opinion is necessary. 98
In Chen v. Ashcroft,99 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's
streamlining decision. Using an analysis similar to that used by
the First Circuit in Haoud, the Ninth Circuit noted that decisions
that are committed to agency discretion by law are not subject to
judicial review. 100 The court then defined a discretionary issue as
a "'subjective question' that depends on the value judgment 'of
presumption that "judicial review is not available" when agencies refuse to take
enforcement steps. See id. at 831.
94 Id. at 830.
95 350 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003).
96 Id. at 206.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 378 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2004).
100 Id. Similar to Haoud, the court relied on the Heckler case for this conclusion.
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the person or entity examining the issue.' '"101 The court
concluded that specific subsections of the streamlining provision
in the regulations were "clearly non-discretionary."' 10 2 A case can
only be streamlined by the BIA if the issues presented are
"squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court precedent
and do not involve the application of precedent to a novel factual
situation .... ."103 A further requirement of the streamlining
procedure is that the "factual and legal issues raised on appeal
are not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a
written opinion in the case." 10 4 The court found that the first of
these two requirements was "clearly" not a discretionary issue.10 5
Moreover, while the second requirement's "insubstantial"
language "will often warrant deference," the court reasoned that
in this case, such deference was not appropriate because the
decision would impact many other similarly situated
immigrants. 106
In Smriko v. Ashcroft,'0 7 the Third Circuit concluded that it
had jurisdiction to review the decision of the BIA to affirm
without opinion an IU's ruling. The court commenced its
discussion of the jurisdiction issue with an analysis of the APA,
noting that "there is a strong presumption that Congress intends
judicial review of administrative action."'08  The court
determined that the dispositive issue was whether the decision to
streamline a case was committed to agency discretion by law. 10 9
Similar to the First Circuit in Haoud, the court here relied on
Heckler's discussion of when agency action is committed to the
agency's discretion by law. 10 As in Haoud, the court here
101 Id. (quoting Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 2003)).
102 Id. at 1088.
103 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A) (2007).
104 Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(B).
105 Chen, 378 F.3d at 1088.
106 See id. at 1086, 1088.
107 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2004).
108 Id. at 290 (quoting Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir.
2003)). The Smriko court concluded its analysis noting that it had jurisdiction to
review the agency action so long as the relevant statute-here the INA--did not
preclude judicial review and the issues presented were not committed to agency
discretion. Id. at 291. The court then indicated that the INA "clearly [did] not
preclude review .... " Id.
109 Id. at 292.
110 Id. (" '[Review is not to be had' in those rare circumstances where the
relevant [law] is 'drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
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concluded that the requirements for streamlining, imposed by
the Code of Federal Regulations, provided ample law with which
to review the BIA's decision.111
The Third Circuit went on to address the Attorney General's
argument that the streamlining provision was intended to
address the limited resources available to the IWs. According to
this argument, the regulation requires the BIA to make a
determination as to whether the issues presented are
"substantial" enough to warrant a written opinion in light of the
limited agency resources. 112 The court rejected this argument,
however, reasoning that the language of the regulation focused
on the importance of the issues rather than the BIA's caseload
and that the subsection was part of a section addressing case
management that was "based solely on the correctness of the
result."11 3
Thus, the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits concluded that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Heckler and the Code of Federal
Regulations provided a clear solution to the issue. The
streamlining regulation described specific criteria that must be
met in order to streamline a case. These courts contended that
these specific criteria provided a meaningful standard against
which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.11 4
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-91 (1993))).
111 See id. at 292-93.
[T]he law to be applied is provided by the criteria of the regulations, and it
will be [a] rare case.. . where the reviewing court. . . will have any
difficulty... reaching a decision as to whether the [BIA] was so wide of the
mark in applying those criteria that his action can be characterized as
arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 293-94.
112 Id. at 293. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(B) states that in order to streamline a
case, the BIA member must determine that the issues presented "are not so
substantial that the case warrants" a written opinion. The Attorney General argued
that this determination was committed to agency discretion because only the agency
is able to consider its available resources. See Smriko, 387 F.3d at 293.
113 See id. at 293. But see Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to
Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 3). This enactment amended the streamlining provisions and noted that
the BIA's overwhelming caseload was the primary concern addressed by the new
provisions.
114 See supra Part II.A.
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B. No Jurisdiction to Review
The Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have concluded that
they do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to
streamline a case. Similar to the courts discussed in Part II.A of
this Note, these courts focused their analysis on the APA and the
Supreme Court's decision in Heckler to determine whether the
streamlining decision was committed to the BIA's discretion by
law.
In Ngure v. Ashcroft,115 the Eighth Circuit concluded that it
did not have jurisdiction to review a BIA member's decision to
affirm without opinion an IJ's ruling. The court gave three
reasons to support its decision not to review the BIA's decision.
First, referring to the separation of powers provided by the
Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, the court stated that
"an administrative agency's decision about how to allocate its
scarce resources to accomplish its complex mission traditionally
has been free from judicial supervision."116 This deference, the
court argued, was appropriate here because the BIA was more
familiar with the issues presented than either Congress or the
judiciary. 117 Furthermore, the court argued that deference was
especially important in the immigration context because in this
setting agency officials "'exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.' "118
Second, the court concluded that the streamlining procedures
were intended to provide the BIA with a way to efficiently use
the agency's scarce resources and not to create substantive rights
for aliens in the immigration courts. 119 Allowing review of the
decision to streamline would frustrate the entire purpose of the
Attorney General's rule. 120 Third, and most significantly, the
court concluded that it could not review the BIA's streamlining
115 367 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2004).
116 Id. at 983 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978)).
117 See id.
118 Id. (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
119 Id. at 983-84. The court noted that the promulgation of the streamlining
provisions by the Department of Justice was accompanied by the following
statement: 'The summary affirmance process ... allows the Board to concentrate its
resources on cases where there is a reasonable possibility of reversal, or where a
significant issue is raised in the appeal ..." Id. at 984.
120 Id.
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provision because it was "not possible to devise a meaningful and
adequate standard" against which to review the BIA's decision.121
The court's third reason for rejecting jurisdiction focused on
two elements that must be met under the regulation in order to
affirm without opinion. First, the court addressed 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i), which required that the result reached by the IJ
was correct. The court found that review of whether the BIA
properly satisfied this requirement would "serve no purpose
whatever" because the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review a final agency determination. 122 When the BIA affirms
without opinion, the IJ's ruling is considered the final agency
determination. 123 Thus, rather than reviewing the BIA decision
to streamline based on the conclusion of the IJ, the court should
simply review the determination of the IJ.124
Next, the court addressed 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(B), which
required that the issues presented on appeal were not "so
substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written
opinion.... ,"125  The court found that this language made the
streamlining determination a "function of the BIA's limited
resources," and thus, particularly within the expertise of the
BIA. 126 Therefore, the court concluded that the decision was
committed to the BIA's discretion by law and thus not subject to
judicial review. 127
In Tsegay v. Ashcroft,128 the Tenth Circuit held that it did not
have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to affirm without
opinion. The court's analysis was guided by American Farm
Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service,129 in which the Supreme
121 Id. at 985. This conclusion was opposite of the one reached by the courts that
concluded they had jurisdiction to review the BIA's streamlining decision. See supra
Part II.A.
122 Ngure, 367 F.3d at 986 (quoting ICC v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S.
270, 279 (1987)).
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 Id. The court concluded that the requirement under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A)-that "issues on appeal are squarely controlled by board
precedent and do not involve the application of precedent to a novel factual
situation"-was not important to its analysis because even if this requirement was
satisfied, the BIA could still streamline if 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(B) was met; the
test was disjunctive. Id.
126 Id.
127 See id.
128 386 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2004).
129 397 U.S. 532 (1970).
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Court stated that unless there was a showing of "'substantial
prejudice to the complaining party' [judicial] review of an agency
decision is always circumscribed when 'a procedural rule is
designed primarily to benefit the agency carrying out its
functions,' rather than 'intended primarily to confer important
procedural benefits upon individuals.' "130 The court provided
three reasons why the BIA's decision was committed to agency
discretion by law. First, the court reasoned that the streamlining
regulation was enacted for the benefit of the BIA in the "orderly
management of its immigration docket."131 Therefore, the court
concluded that under American Farm Lines the decision to
streamline was in the "category of decisions committed to the
agency's discretion and beyond [the court's] jurisdiction to
review." 13 2  Second, the court reasoned that because the
regulation expressly prohibited the BIA from issuing a reasoned
opinion when affirming without opinion, judicial review of such
action would be "impractical."133 Third, the court concluded that
because an asylum applicant will have received a written opinion
on the merits by the IJ before the BIA streamlines the case, the
applicant is not "substantially prejudiced."' 134
In Kambolli v. Gonzales,135 the Second Circuit concluded that
it did not have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to
streamline a case because there was "no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion." 136 The
court first noted that the regulation expressly prohibited the BIA
from issuing an opinion when streamlining and thus, a reviewing
court would have "no knowledge ... of the decision making
process of the BIA member."137 The court also found that judicial
review of the decision to streamline would inappropriately
undermine the streamlining rules.138
130 Tsegay, 386 F.3d at 1355 (quoting Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight
Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970)).
131 Id. at 1356.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1356-57.
134 Id. at 1357.
135 449 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 2006).
136 Id. at 461 (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993)).
137 Id. at 461-62. The court also noted that the regulation's prohibition on
written opinions is a clear indication that the Attorney General did not intend the
streamlining decision to be subject to judicial review. See id. at 462.
138 Id. at 463.
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Relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Vermont
Yankee, that "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties," the Kambolli court "decline[d] the
invitation to cripple the streamlining process" by subjecting it to
judicial review. 139 Furthermore, the court stated that it lacked
the "expertise" required to decide whether streamlining was
appropriate, whereas the BIA was exceptionally qualified to do
so. 140 The court finally noted that a lack of jurisdiction in this
area would not deprive aliens of substantive rights because the
courts have jurisdiction to review an IJ's decision.141
In sum, the courts that denied jurisdiction to review the
streamlining decision have given several reasons for denying it.
First, they argued that review would be impractical because
there is no rationale to review when the BIA affirms a case
without opinion. Additionally, they asserted that the principle of
the separation of power requires judicial deference to the BIA in
carrying out its administrative tasks. Finally, these courts
concluded that the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion is
"committed to agency discretion by law" under the APA.142
III. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CHANGES AND A PROPOSED
RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT
In August 2006, subsequent to the rulings in the six cases
discussed in Part II, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
announced that he would implement twenty-two measures aimed
at overhauling the immigration courts and the BIA. 143 Most
significantly for the purposes of this Note, Gonzales announced
an alteration of the streamlining provision to allow for the more
frequent use of written opinions by the BIA to explain their
rationale. This Note contends that the circuit courts should have
jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to affirm without opinion
because one of the key rationales given by the courts opposing
139 Id. at 464 (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)).
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2000).
143 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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review was that the BIA was expressly prohibited from writing
opinions when streamlining a case. This section will address the
issue of written opinions by the BIA, as well as several other
reasons why the courts opposing judicial review were misguided,
and will conclude that judicial review of the BIA's decision to
affirm without opinion should be permitted.
A. Adjustments to the BIA
In his announcement of the measures to improve the
immigration courts and the BIA, former Attorney General
Gonzales stated that "[s]ome adjustments to streamlining ... are
appropriate to allow the Board to improve and better explain its
reasoning in certain cases."144 Accordingly, Gonzales announced:
The Director of EOIR will draft a proposed rule that will adjust
streamlining practices to (i) encourage the increased use of one-
member written opinions to address poor or intemperate [IJ]
decisions that reach the correct result but would benefit from
discussion or clarification; and (ii) allow the limited use of three-
member written opinions-as opposed to one-member written
opinions-to provide greater legal analysis in a small class of
particularly complex cases .... The Assistant Attorney General
for Legal Policy ... will draft a proposed rule that would return
cases to the [BIA] for reconsideration when [the Office of
Immigration Litigation] identifies a case that has been filed in
federal court and, in OIL's view, warrants reconsideration. 145
This proposal made it clear that Gonzales felt more
explanation was appropriate in many cases that previously had
been affirmed without opinion. It also deflated the argument
posed by the courts rejecting the exercise of judicial review of
streamlining decisions that review was impractical because the
streamlining regulation expressly prohibited the issuance of
written opinions when the BIA decided to affirm without
opinion. 146 In Ngure, the Eighth Circuit implied that, based on
the "basic principle of administrative law," if an agency is subject
to judicial review it must provide an "adequate reasoned
explanation of its decision," the decision to affirm without opinion
144 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 85, at 4.
145 Id. at 4-5.
146 The relevant regulation states: "An order affirming without opinion, issued
under authority of this provision, shall not include further explanation or
reasoning." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2007).
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must be free from judicial review because the regulation
prohibits the issuance of an explanation. 147 Additionally, in
Tsegay, the Tenth Circuit noted that the regulation's prohibition
of written opinions makes judicial review impractical because the
reviewing court would be forced to remand the case to the BIA for
an explanation before reviewing it. This act, in essence, would be
the equivalent of the courts "rewriting the Attorney General's
own regulation." 148  Former Attorney General Gonzales's
announcement indicated, however, that his "own regulation" will
be rewritten. The increased emphasis on written opinions in
Gonzales's announcement showed that he was in favor of more
written opinions, and thus, remand by the courts to the BIA for
an explanation will not conflict with the intent of the regulation.
Another important consideration is the indiscretion exhibited by
many IJs in the cases coming before them, discussed previously
in Part I of this Note.149 As former Attorney General Gonzales's
proposals made clear, the EOIR is charged with fixing the
problems it has had with intemperate IJs. Allowing judicial
review of the BIA's decision to streamline IJ decisions will allow
the courts to further ensure that IJs carry out their duties
professionally.
B. Application of Heckler to the Controversy
Most of the circuits ruling on whether they have jurisdiction
to review the BIA's streamlining decision have grounded their
analysis in Heckler.150 In Heckler, the Supreme Court indicated
that there was a presumption that "judicial review [was] not
available" when agencies refused to take enforcement steps. 51
The Court first noted that the "committed to agency discretion"
exception to the general rule of judicial reviewability under the
APA was a "very narrow exception," and that "the legislative
history of the [APA] indicate[d] that it [was] applicable in those
rare instances where 'statutes [were] drawn in such broad terms
that in a given case there [was] no law to apply.' "152 The reasons
147 Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 984 (8th Cir. 2004).
148 Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1357 (10th Cir. 2004).
149 See supra Part I.C.
150 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
151 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-31 (1985).
152 Id. at 830 (citation omitted) (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
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supporting this presumption were that in deciding not to act
(1) the agency undertook a complex balancing procedure, the
factors of which were particularly within the expertise of the
agency; (2) the agency did not exercise coercive power over an
individual, and "thus [did] not infringe upon areas that courts
often are called upon to protect;" and (3) the decision shared
some of the characteristics of prosecutors' decisions not to indict,
a decision that has long been regarded as beyond review. 15 3
Applying these factors to the BIA's decision to affirm without
opinion leads to the precisely opposite conclusion-that judicial
review of the BIA's action is appropriate.
The Heckler court first asked whether the agency's decision
involved a complex balancing procedure that was particularly
within the expertise of the agency. 154 When deciding to affirm
without opinion, the BIA has three specific criteria to analyze.
First, the result of the IJ must be correct. 155 Since the courts
already have jurisdiction to review the decision of the IJ for
correctness, this requirement poses no obstacle for the courts.
Second, the BIA must determine whether the issues on appeal
are squarely controlled by existing precedent and if they involve
the "application of precedent to a novel factual situation."156 This
step certainly does not involve any type of balancing procedure.
Moreover, determining whether precedents apply to particular
fact patterns is within the expertise of a court. Third, the BIA
must determine whether the issues on appeal are substantial
enough to warrant a written opinion. 157 This requirement is the
most difficult of the three on which to conclude. The courts
holding that they cannot review the streamlining decision argue
that the substantial requirement involves a complex balancing
process that must take into account the resource constraints of
the BIA, thus analogizing the BIA's decision to the FDA's
decision in Heckler.158 In contrast, the courts holding that they
can review the streamlining decision argue that the streamlining
153 Id. at 831-32.
154 Id. at 831.
155 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(i)(4) (2007).
156 Id. § 1003.1(e)(i)(4)(A).
157 Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(B). This requirement and the second requirement are
joined in the C.F.R. by the word "or" and thus satisfaction of either is sufficient to
streamline the case. Id. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i)(A)-(B).
15s See, e.g., Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 2006); Tsegay v.
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1356 (10th Cir. 2004).
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decision focuses on reaching the correct result in a case and
thus does not give any consideration to the BIA's resource
allocation. 159 This issue, however, is not dispositive because the
remaining two steps in the Heckler analysis make it clear that
the streamlining decision does not deserve the same deference
that agency inaction is given.
The next factor in the Heckler analysis focused on the
agency's inaction. 160 In Heckler, the plaintiff challenged the
FDA's decision not to bring enforcement proceedings. 161 The
Court reasoned that deference was appropriate in such a
situation because the agency did not "exercise coercive power
over an individual's liberty or property rights. ."... 162 In contrast
to a failure to act, when an agency does act, "that action itself
provides a focus for judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must
have exercised its power in some manner."'163 Similarly, when
the BIA streamlines a case, it exercises its power by affirming
the result reached by the IJ.164 This affirmation makes the IJ's
decision the "final agency determination" and thus is an "exercise
of power" by the BIA over the petitioner's individual liberty. 165
Thus, application of this prong of the Heckler analysis suggests
that the streamlining decision is subject to judicial review.
The third and final factor in the Heckler analysis asks
whether the challenged act "shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive
Branch not to indict."1 66 The decision to streamline a case in no
way resembles the decision of a prosecutor not to indict and thus,
this prong of the analysis leads to the conclusion that judicial
review of the streamlining decision is permissible.
In Heckler, the Court distinguished between an agency's
affirmative acts and an agency's decision not to act. The
Court reversed the Court of Appeals, which held that the FDA's
refusal to act was reviewable based on the "presumption
of reviewability" implied by a narrow construction of the
159 See, e.g., Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 292 (3d Cir. 2004).
160 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
161 Id. at 823.
162 Id. at 832.
163 Id.
164 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (2007).
165 See id.
166 Heckler, 471 U.S. at 832.
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"committed to agency discretion" exception. 16 7 The lower court
based its "presumption of reviewability" on Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 168 the first case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the "committed to agency discretion"
exception. 169 In reversing the appellate court's decision in
Heckler, the Supreme Court stated:
Overton Park did not involve an agency's refusal to take
requested enforcement action. It involved an affirmative act of
approval under a statute that set clear guidelines for
determining when such approval should be given. Refusals to
take enforcement steps generally involve precisely the opposite
situation, and in that situation we think the presumption is
that judicial review is not available. 170
Thus, when an agency affirmatively approves an action under a
statute that provides clear guidance in granting that approval,
judicial review of the agency's action is permissible. This
situation is analogous to the BIA's streamlining decision, which
is an affirmative act of approval effected under the clear
guidance provided in the Code of Federal Regulations.
C. Separation of Powers Argument Is Misguided
The Second and Eighth Circuits both argued that the
judiciary should show deference to the BIA's decision making
power, and thus should not review the decision to streamline. 171
These courts grounded this rationale primarily on Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,172 in which the Supreme Court expressed great
deference to agency rulemaking procedures. The Eighth Circuit
further supported its argument with Immigration and
Naturalization Services v. Aguirre-Aguirre, which spoke of the
executive branch's protected operation in immigration issues
where it "'exercise[s] especially sensitive political functions that
implicate questions of foreign relations.' "173 This section argues
167 See id. at 831.
168 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
169 See Heckler, 471 U.S. at 829-31.
170 Id. at 831.
171 See Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 456 (2d Cir. 2006); Ngure v.
Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004).
172 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
173 Ngure, 367 F.3d at 983 (quoting INS. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999)).
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that the holdings of these two cases are not applicable to the
streamlining issue, and thus they fail to adequately support the
Second and Eighth Circuit conclusion that they cannot review
the streamlining decision.
At issue in Vermont Yankee was a rulemaking proceeding
instituted by the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") to adopt
rules that considered the environmental impact of nuclear power
plant construction. 174 The Natural Resources Defense Council
challenged the rule promulgated by the proceeding, and the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia ruled that the
rulemaking proceedings were inadequate, overturning the
rule.175 The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals
overstepped its authority in overturning the AEC's rule, stating
that "[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling
circumstances the 'administrative agencies should be free to
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties.' "176
The Court's focus in this case was on the procedures
employed by the AEC during its rulemaking proceedings, rather
than, as is the focus when determining the applicability of
judicial review to the streamlining decision, an agency's
application of a previously enacted rule.177 In Vermont Yankee,
the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals to strike
down a "rule because of the perceived inadequacies of the
procedures employed in the rulemaking proceeding."'178 The
Court concluded that "Congress intended that the discretion of
the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised in
determining when extra procedural devices should be
employed."179
In contrast, the BIA streamlines a case pursuant to an
enacted rule. No party has challenged the legitimacy of the rule
itself or the proceedings under which it was enacted. At issue is
whether the judiciary should review the decision to affirm
without opinion. The issue, holding, and rationale of Vermont
174 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 519.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965)).
177 See id. at 539-43.
178 Id. at 541.
179 Id. at 546.
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Yankee are inapposite to this issue and thus reliance on it for any
conclusion is inappropriate. The deference called for by Vermont
Yankee is distinct from the deference suggested by the Second
and Eighth Circuits. Courts have traditionally reviewed
decisions of agencies under agency rules according to the APA.
The APA provides for a general rule of reviewability except in the
rarest of circumstances.
In Aguirre-Aguirre, the Supreme Court stated that judicial
deference was especially appropriate in the immigration context
because of the implications such intrusions may have on foreign
relations.180 Yet, all three circuits ruling against jurisdiction to
review the streamlining decision have conceded that the judiciary
can review the decision of the IJ, as the final agency action, and
thus intrude into this delicate sphere. 81  Moreover, judicial
review of the BIA's decision to streamline, because it will not
always directly affect the final outcome of the case, surely poses
less of a threat of damaging foreign relations than does the
judiciary's review of the final agency action of removal, which it
does when reviewing the IJ's opinion. The APA expressly
provides for judicial review of the final agency action, and the
INA expressly provides for judicial review over the final order of
removal.18 2 In light of the clear congressional intent to allow for
judicial review in these circumstances, courts seem misguided in
using this argument to support a holding against judicial review.
Furthermore, the Code of Federal Regulations sections
addressing the BIA's case management system, of which the
streamlining provisions are a part, also provide that cases of
"major national import" can be assigned by the BIA to a three
member panel. 8 3 If a court reviewing the decision to streamline
a case found that it implicated issues significantly affecting
180 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).
181 See Kambolli v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 454, 456 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that the
courts have jurisdiction to "review the IJ's decision as the final agency action");
Tsegay v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1347, 1353 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he INA grants us
general jurisdiction to review a 'final order of removal'...." (quoting
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2000))); Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 986 (8th Cir. 2004)
('When the BIA summarily affirms, the decision of the IJ becomes the final agency
determination. An alien may petition the court of appeals for review of the agency
decision.").
182 Administrative Procedure Act §704, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2000).
183 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(iv) (2000).
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foreign relations, the appropriate response would be to remand it
to the BIA for analysis by a three member panel.
CONCLUSION
The APA and the INA, which grant authority to the
immigration courts, provide a general rule that agency action is
subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court's interpretation of
these statutes has concluded that the exception to this general
rule is "very narrow."18 4 The Court has only denied judicial
review of agency action where the agency decided not to act or
where the law is drawn so broadly that a court would have no
standard to apply. In contrast to these situations, the decision to
streamline is an affirmative act based on a narrowly drawn rule.
The courts ruling against judicial review of streamlined cases
have misconstrued Supreme Court precedent, analogizing the
streamlining decision to agency decisions too dissimilar to
provide adequate support. Given the narrow reading the
Supreme Court applies to the exceptional situations in which
review of agency action is not permissible and the fact that the
decision to streamline does not fit neatly into the Court's
previous analysis, judicial review of the streamlining decision
should be allowed.
Furthermore, the recent critiques of the immigration courts
by the federal courts, TRAC, and the former Attorney General
emphasize the importance of judicial review in these cases.
Judicial review is an integral component of the system of checks
and balances, which is designed to correct and prevent the type
of abuses that have occurred within the immigration court
system. Applicants for asylum in the United States face many
obstacles. Improperly placing additional obstacles in their path
benefits neither the immigration courts nor the federal courts.
184 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
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